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This study examines the relation between pay inequalities in top management teams and how efficiently firms convey valuation-relevant information to investors. Given that reward comparisons with reference groups create feelings of inequity, top management team pay inequalities can impair the information environment. This manifests into lengthier or less readable financial reports.

This paper employs an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to test whether and how the pay distribution in the top management team is associated with the readability of the annual report. It also employs a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression model to further address the endogeneity concern. Lastly, it conducts cross-sectional analyses to examine heterogeneity in the observed relation.

Using the intra-firm pay gap as a proxy for pay inequality and file size, Bog Index and Fog Index of the 10-K filings as a proxy for financial report readability, the author finds that firms with larger pay gaps exhibit lengthier or less readable 10-K filings. The main findings are robust to the use of an instrumental variable approach. She finds some evidence that the relation is less pronounced when pay gaps are justified by explicit legal authority of CEOs or high ability of CEOs. The main results are robust to considerations of alternative explanations.

This paper adds a new dimension to the debate on pay inequality by studying pay gaps in the top management team and financial report readability. The author's findings have important implications for executive compensation policies and for corporate disclosure policies.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how product market relationships are related to firms’ real activities manipulation (RAM), which refers to managers’ aggressive operating practices. Given the importance of suppliers’ relationship-specific investments to a firm’s competitiveness, the need for suppliers’ relationship-specific investments is expected to influence a firm’s RAM.

This paper adopts Nunn’s (2007) proxy for relationship-specificity and four proxies for RAM. It employs an ordinary least squares regression model to test whether a firm decreases RAM when it has greater need for supplier relationship-specific investments. It also uses an instrumental variable approach to address endogeneity and conducts cross-sectional analyses.

This study finds that, with the exception of RAM through sales manipulation, the importance of relationship-specific investments by suppliers is negatively associated with firms’ aggressive operating decisions. It also finds that the association between relationship-specificity and RAM is less pronounced for firms that have a greater market share but more pronounced for firms that are relatively young, consistent with the notion that a firm is more likely to be under pressure from its suppliers to reduce RAM when it has less competitive advantages. The results suggest that product market relationships play an important role in influencing managers’ aggressive operating decisions.

This study complements earlier work on earnings quality and has important implications for investors, regulators and other stakeholders who are concerned with corporate earnings quality.

This paper contributes to the literature on product market relationships and earnings quality and on financial reporting quality and investment efficiency.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between executive compensation of peer firms and earnings management. Given the prevalence of the competitive benchmarking practice in executive compensation, chief executive officer (CEO) compensation of potential peer firms can influence the behavior of CEOs at their current firms.

This paper employs an ordinary least squares regression model to test whether CEO compensation of other firms in similar product markets is associated with a firm’s accruals management. It also employs firm fixed effects regressions to control for time invariant omitted variables. Lastly, it conducts subsample analyses based on CEO duality and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and a propensity score matching analysis.

Using time-varying industry classifications based on product similarity, the author finds that CEO compensation of other firms in similar product markets is positively associated with a firm’s accruals management. The relation is more pronounced for firms with CEO duality, while it is less pronounced in the period after the passage of SOX. The main findings are robust to the use of firm fixed effects regressions, a propensity score matching analysis, and an alternative weighting scheme.

This paper contributes to the literature on executive compensation and earnings management. It provides useful insight into the spillover effect of other firms’ executive compensation on earnings management.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether sell-side equity analysts use labor cost information when forming expectations of future earnings. The availability of disaggregated earnings components will benefit financial statement users to the extent that the additional information released by a firm is useful to infer differential persistence of disaggregated earnings components.

This paper employs ordinary least squares, logit, and two-stage Heckman (1979) regressions which test whether analysts incorporate labor cost information into their earnings forecasts after controlling for a managerial self-selection to disclose labor costs, and further test whether a firm’s decision to voluntarily disclose labor costs improves analyst forecast accuracy.

This research finds that analysts incorporate labor cost information into their earnings forecasts after controlling for other earnings components. More importantly, this research shows that voluntary disclosure of labor cost information is positively associated with analyst forecast accuracy. Additional tests show that the benefit of voluntary labor cost information is more pronounced for firms with high information uncertainty and for analysts with less firm-specific experience and analysts affiliated with small brokerage houses.

This paper contributes to the literatures on the effect of labor cost on investors’ behavior and on analyst-specific factors in explaining analyst ability to predict future earnings.

This paper aims to attend to the issues that remain veiled and excluded in the name of multiculture.

This paper problematizes South Korean multicultural education policies through Bourdieu’s concept of capital as a theoretical frame.

First, the paper discusses that material wealth is unequally distributed to most of the multicultural families, resulting in their lack of economic capital. Second, it notes that students from multicultural families are deprived of cultural capital, as they are racialized in Korean society. As a strategy used to distinguish and exclude a so-called different minority from the unnamed majority, race enables the possession of cultural capital. Third, insufficient social capital identified with resources emerging from social networks positions students from multicultural families as a perpetual minority. As the accumulation of various forms of capital secures power and privilege (Bourdieu, 1986), multicultural education in its current state would continuously reproduce the existing power dynamics where students from multicultural families are subordinate.

Given this, policies for multicultural education in South Korea should cover a wide range of issues, including race, class and network and be redesigned to resolve realistic problems that have been hidden under the name of celebration of culture.

The Korean multicultural education policy has not been analyzed through Bourdieu’s concept of capital. Using a different theoretical viewpoint would be valuable to figure out the problems underlying the policy.